NGO's ADVOCATION AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE PROCESS OF SOCIAL REHABILITATION FOR VICTIMS OF LAPINDO MUDFLOW DISASTER (Study In Sidoarjo District, East Java, Indonesia)

NGO's ADVOCATION AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION

IN THE PROCESS OF SOCIAL REHABILITATION

FOR VICTIMS OF LAPINDO MUDFLOW DISASTER

(Study In Sidoarjo District, East Java, Indonesia)

Writer:

Oman Sukmana

E-mail Address: osukmana@ymail.com; oman@umm.ac.id

Sociological Doctoral Program, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences,

Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia.

Lecturer of Social Welfare Departement, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences,

Muhammadiyah Malang University, Indonesia.

Abstract

Lapindo mudflow disaster has caused tremendous physical and non-physical impact, causing a crisis for the social life of citizens in Porong, and surrounding areas. NGO's advocation and government intervention in various forms of social rehabilitation programs are needed to assist the impact of Lapindo mudflow disaster. This study aims at identifying and describing the impact of Lapindo mudflow disaster;  and the role of NGO's advocacy and the government intervention in the process of social rehabilitation for victims of the disaster. The results proved that the Lapindo mudflow disaster has brought destruction of settlement areas, rice fields, agricultural, and industrial which was statistically about 1,071 hectares, 6 villages,  33 schools and 33 factories were destroyed, and approximately 48,983 people were displaced. Moreover, it undeniably carried non-physicalvimpacts such as social aspects, health, education, psychological, economic, and so on. Social advocacy by NGOs include mentoring programs and litigation efforts. Government, in the other side, interferred in the process of social rehabilitation for victims of Lapindo mudflow disaster stated in the policy as stipulated by Presidential Decree No. 14/2007, Presidential Decree No. 48/2008, Presidential Decree No. 40/2009, Presidential Decree No. 37/2012, Presidential Decree No. 33/2013. Forms of government intervention include facilitation of policy, institutional and budgetary allocations.

Keywords: NGO's Advocacy, Government Intervention, Disaster of Lapindo  Mudflow.

Preliminary

May 29, 2006 is the beginning of the emergence of the Lapindo mudflow disaster. Mud with a volume between 100 thousand to 150 thousand M3 per day, spurted from the bowels of earth and rapidly drowned residential, agriculture, and industry areas (Batubara & Utomo, 2012:3)[1]. Lapindo mudflow disaster is located in District of Porong, approximately 12 km South of Sidoarjo Regency. The spot is about 15 meters from the Banjar Panji-1 (BJP-1),  a place of gas exploration owned by PT Lapindo Brantas Inc. (PT LBI) or the Brantas block operator. It blocked areas from regency of Jombang, Mojokerto, Sidoarjo to Pasuruan, East Java. It covers residential and main industrial area of East Java. Not far from the location of the mudflow, there are toll roads, Gempol Surabaya, the highway of Surabaya-Malang  and the highway of Banyuwangi-Surabaya-Pasuruan, and railways  of East Surabaya-Malang and Surabaya-Banyuwangi.

According to Prasetia and Batubara (2010:40)[2], Lapindo mudflow is a complex disaster seen from its genealogy. Experts from all over the world has created debates on it. They generally splited two arguments. First part assumed that the disaster was caused by drilling activity in gas exploration wells Banjar Panji-1 (BJP-1) belonged to PT LBI, and the rest believed that it was caused by reactivation of regional faults Watukosek due to Yogyakarta earthquake on May 27, 2006, just two days before the Lapindo mudflow disaster occured.

However, a meeting of petroleum geologists in South Africa, has concluded that it was unquestionably caused by gas exploration process, not by a tremor. Forty-two out of the 74 scientists who attended in the conference of American Association of Petroleum Geologists (AAPG) convinced that the drilling triggered the mud eruption. Three of them agreed that it is caused by the earthquake, sixteen scientists remains uncertain, and the rest considered it as the combination of tremor activity and drilling process. At last, the geologists in AAPG conference concluded that it is the direct result of the drilling[3] which is often called ‘Lusi’ by local people.  

The Government claimed the phenomenon as a natural disaster based on the decision of the Central Jakarta District Court dated November 27, 2007, which stated that the government and Lapindo were not in charge for any unlawful act. The verdict of Jakarta High Court on June 13, 2008, strengthened the verdict of Central Jakarta District Court on the date of  November 27, 2007, which mentioned that the incident caused by natural symptom is more dominant than by human error. Decision of the Supreme Court of (MA) cassation, on the April 3, 2009, stated that disaster was a natural phenomenon and not the fault of the industry, and the decision has permanent legal force (inkracht).

In 2013, Lapindo mudflow disaster has been running for seven years and it has not shown its signs to stop, although the volume is somewhat diminished. Nobody is certain when it will end. According to Richard Davies[4]  and his colleagues, it is difficult to calculate the termination. However, some researchers estimated that it is going to continue for 26 years. It is also expected to stop in 2037[5].

Regarding the complexity of the disaster, it will be interesting to study deeper on the impacts, the form and role of government intervention, and the NGO's assistance in the process of social rehabilitation of the victim of Lapindo mudflow disaster.

Review of Literature

Disaster is a condition or a situation caused by human actions or natural occurance, which happens suddenly or gradually, led to chaos and loss of life, material, as well as the environment. It exceeds the capacity of communities for overcoming the problem using the  ability of their own resources.

 In line with the understanding of disaster, a social disaster is seen as a situation caused by human actions which leads to some impacts. Social disaster might be caused by social conflict openly and widely, war, or other social unrest[6].

Rehabilitation is the repair and restoration of all aspects of the public service or a community to an acceptable level in post-disaster areas with the main goal for the normalization and for the utilization of all aspects of the government and society in post-disaster areas. Rehabilitation is done through the following activities: (a) improvement of environmental disaster areas; (b) improvement of public infrastructure and facilities; (c) relief society home improvement; (d) psychosocial recovery; (e) health services; (f) reconciliation and conflict of resolution; (g) socio-economic of culture assistance; (h) restoration of peace and order; (i) recovery of the functions of government; and (j) the recovery function of public service[7].

Because the social impact of the disaster exceeds the capability of the victims to deal with their own resource capability, then it is necessary of advocacy (assistance) and social intervention from outsiders to the process of social rehabilitation. According to Abdul Hakim Nusantara (Miller & Covey, 2005: vii)[8], advocacy is defined as the act or process to defend or support. Support to community groups weak is intensified by personal, groups, non-Governmental Organization (NGOs), and community organizations, that has a concern for the problems of human rights, environment, poverty, and other forms of injustice. In a wider sense, advocacy is a political process by individuals or groups that are generally aimed at influencing public policy and resource allocation decisions within political, economic, or social institutions and systems. Advocacy can include many activities (form), such as: Budget advocacy, Bureaucratic advocacy, Health advocacy, Ideological advocacy, Interests-group advocacy, Legislative advocacy, Mass of advocacy, and Media advocacy[9].

Samuel (2007: 616)[10]  states that public advocacy is a deliberate set of actions who designs to influence public policy or public attitudes in order to empower those who are marginalized. The main difference between public advocacy and human-centered advocacy is that the goal of human-centered advocacy is to empower people, especially people who are marginalized. In the context of liberal democratic culture, public advocacy is used as an instrument by applying the meaning of non-violence and constitutional. Public advocacy as a political process driven by value, seeks to challenge and change the unequal power relationships that result in people marginalized socially, political, and economically. Advocacy process include: (1) reject unequal power relations in every level, including patriarchy system, from a personal to the public, from family to government; (2) involve government agencies to empower marginalized people;  (3) create and use space  in the system for a change; (4) strategies using knowledge, skills, and opportunity in influencing public policy; and (5) integrate the micro-level activity and macro-level policy initiatives.

Furthermore, Samuel (2007: 616)[11]  conducted a study on the process of advocacy in India. According to Samuel, in the Indian context, grassroots organization and mobilization are used to build awareness and demand rights as citizens, and ensure the credibility, legitimacy, and the bargaining power in the public advocacy. In India, one of the many advocacies of social justice is the application of legislation and social security programs. It includes progressive legislation such as the Equal Remuneration Act, the Act of Dowry Prohibition, the Act of Bond Labor Prohibition, and the Act of Prevention of Atrocities against Caste.

Parties who undertake the advocates depart from an understanding and belief that the injustices inflicted on the poor or oppressed communities due to asymmetrical social power relations and unequal. Power relations are unequal and undemocratic action produces the rejection to the participation of the poor (marginalize groups) in the process and mechanisms of decision-making. Decision-making processes and mechanisms that are not democratic in it produce a variety of policies that harm the rights and interests of the poor (marginal groups). In this perspective, advocacy is an activity planned jointly by community groups, for the purpose of transforming the system of social relations that creates asymmetrical power relations, and is not democratic, towards the realization of the social fabric underlying symmetrical power relations, more democratic and fair. Advocacy activities are planned and performed toward to the ideal society formation.

In the Indonesian context, advocacy activities is undertaken by NGOs and grassroots organizations including various forms of advocacy such as: education, awareness, and organizing groups of poor people, providing legal assistance activities  or defense of the rights and interests of the poor in the court. The activities include lobbying to the centers of decision-making with respect to environmental management by NGOs who engaged in advocacy and environmental law, such as the Legal Aid Foundation of Indonesia (YLBHI), the Indonesian Environmental Forum (Walhi), and many other environmental organizations. Similarly, the consumer society of Indonesia through the Indonesian Consumers Foundation and other consumer NGOs have long been advocating the rights and interests of consumers through education and awareness programs, litigation, and lobbying to the centers of decision-making in order to issue a policy that is responsive and productive for the rights of consumers.

Furthermore, Miller and Covey (2005:13)[12]  states that the approach to advocacy can be vary depending on the political context in which the organization works. Advocacy strategies vary from approaches that emphasize co-operation with the authorities and focuses on education and appeals. They are openly use the oppose approach, and the use of combined strategies which are mutually reinforcing. For example, one of the NGOs working in Africa under an authoritarian regime uses behind-the-scenes approach to create change. In the Philippines, in the case of the Urban Land Restructuring where a broad coalition of NGOs, housing associations, and major church leaders apply an approach that ranges from demonstrations in the street and on a banquet held by the Catholic bishops and important commissions in Congress, to drafts of legislation. In Ecuador a strong national indigenous movement in collaboration with supporters of the ruling church as well as important international NGOs allied to overturn legislation that would eliminate legal protections on lands owned by indigenous.

For fear that their land will eventually disappear, the Indians movement use a wide range of advocation strategies and tactics to achieve their goals. First they ask the advice of the members on the impact of the law, gather knowledge and the findings of their grass roots and then mobilize the members to open up political space for negotiation with the government. To expand the space, they blockaded highways, occupied government buildings, using media coverage, using the court system to obtain a favorable decision when the army intervened, and spoke with officials from major bank in Washington. These actions ultimately led to openly way for negotiations with the country's president and other government leaders to produce significant concessions.

Meanwhile, the concept of social intervention refers to the process of changes through the ongoing social relationships (Bennett, 1987:13)[13]. Social intervention process includes how to start a change, evolve, and survive in the social world. According to Parson (Bennett, 1987:13)[14] , social intervention is related to the process of changing the system, not the process of change in the system. Change the system is related to changes or transformations that try to overcome problem in the system.

According to Loewenberg (1977:7)[15], in the context of social work, the term of social interventions emphasize to the active participation, aim, and plan both by the client and social worker in every phase of the process of social intervention. Intervention activities are responses to a specific problem, or as an effort to prevent the occurrence of the development of problems in individuals, groups, or communities. Furthermore Loewenberg (1977: 25)[16]  states that the processes of social intervention include: (1) Recognition of problem, (2) Request for Help, (3) Preliminary Assessment, (4) Problem Assessment and Goals Identification, (5) Strategy Development, (6) Contract Negotiation, (7) Implementation of Strategy, (8) Feedback and Evaluation, and (9) Termination.

Critical intervention is one of the techniques used in handling (rehabilitation) social disaster victims. Critical interventions, is interventions that aim at providing as much support and assistance to individuals and families, in order to allow people who is helped regain psychological balance as quickly as possible[17]. According to Roberts (Payne, 1997: 101), the steps in the critical interventions include: (1) assessing risk and safety of clients and others, (2) establish rapport and communication with clients, (3) identity of major problems, (4) deal with feelings and provide support, (5) explore possible alternatives, (6) formulate an action plan, and (7) provide follow-up support.

Research Methods

This study uses an interpretive-constructivist paradigm. All research who is characterized an interpretive, guided by a set of beliefs and feelings about the world and how to understand and study it (Denzim & Lincoln, 2009:16)[18]. According to Denzim and Guba (Salim, 2001:71)[19], the purpose of research of the interpretive-constructivist paradigm is to hold a reconstruction of understanding and social action.

According to Marvasti (2004:8)[20], the purpose of the research of constructionist  concerns with how cultural and situational variation is coloring (shaping) a reality. The research approach used is qualitative approach. According to Denzim and Lincoln (2009:6)[21], the word qualitative implies an emphasis on processes and meanings that are not rigorously examined or has not been measured in terms of quantity, amount, intensity, or frequency. A method used in this study is phenomenology. According to Denzim and Guba (Salim, 2001:89)[22], phenomenology is the method of research with a qualitative approach. Similarly, Creswell (2007: 53)[23]  states that phenomenology is one of the five approaches to qualitative inquiry. Data collection techniques include interviews, observation, and documentation.

Results and Discussion

1. Lapindo mudflow disaster impact:

Lapindo mudflow disaster which occurred since on May 29, 2006 have impacted to the environment and people who lived  the district of Sidoarjo, particularly in three sub-districts areas who include in  "the Affected Area Map",  namely sub-district of: Porong, Tanggulangin and  Jabon. Disaster of Lapindo mudflow has destroyed about 16 villages, of which 1,071 acres area that include the area of agriculture, aquaculture, industrial, and residential areas. Some areas must be vacated, either by drowning or due to uninhabitable declaration as a result of mudflow and danger of blowouts. More than 15,788 households or 48,983 people had to move from their residence to a new place.

The impact of  Lapindo mudflow disaster besides  make changing in the region Porong, Tanggulangin, and Jabon due to the loss of some areas. The drown and uninhabitable areas have led the changes in various aspects, such as: economic, social, environmental, education, and so on.

Damaged assets consist of: (1) Land and building residential population, (2) productive crops, such as paddy, sugarcane, and pulses, (3) building and plant equipment, and (4) infrastructure, such as highways, power lines, irrigation systems, water supply networks, telecommunication networks, gas pipelines, etc..

Economic losses due to Lapindo  mudflow at least are divided into two, namely direct cost or direct loss  which costs more less of Rp 50 billion per day, and the indirect cost or indirect loss that is more less of Rp 500 billion per day. According to the Governor of East Java, Soekarwo, with reference to the results of studies of the Faculty of Economics, University of Brawijaya, Lapindo mud disaster loss reaches Rp 33 trillion per year.

The data in 2009 showed that as many as 3,562 workers are affected by layoffs because several companies closed and several of other companies fired their workers/employees.

Meanwhile, it is about 2,302 workers mudflow victims are still in condition that are not apparent, without a job due to the factory flooded by mud. According to the Indonesia National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM), the public's right to work or create new jobs also disappeared caused of mudflow. According to recent data (2013) as described by the chairman of the Association of Company Lapindo Mudflow Victims (GPKLL), Drs. S.H. Ritonga, there are 33 companies/factories are forced to close due to waterlogged mud which caused approximately 10,000 employees (workers) lost their jobs. In the field of education, at least about 33 school buildings ranging from kindergarten to high school were destroyed by mudflow. As a result, 5,397 students had to move to another school or study at emergency school. Such conditions are a threat to the school dropouts.

Besides, the material loss also triggered non-physical impacts or non-physical loss on the communities, namely socio-cultural, psychology and public health loss. Non-physical impact had not becoming a major concern from responsibles, which should provide compensation to the affected people and felt the damage socio-cultural, psychological and health. For example, socio-cultural impact like the destruction of the social order, values, norms, and traditions have already built dozens or even hundreds of years in the life of the community. Variety of illnesses suffered by the victims of the Lapindo mudflow disaster, such as : Acute Respiratory inspections (based on reports of three health centers in the three sub-districts affected, there is a significant increase in the number of patients with respiratory disorders), skin cancer, cough-cough, etc.; Psychological impact, such as the emergence of feelings of worry, stress, and even depression.

2.  Disaster of Lapindo mudflow and the reproduction of injustice

Lapindo mudflow disaster has become the arena of reproductive of injustices committed by the corporation (PT LBI) and the state (government) to the Lapindo mudflow victims. Things that are considered as injustice (controversy) by the victims of the Lapindo mudflow disaster, as follows:

First; Injustice (controversy) is felt by the victims of the Lapindo mud on issues relating to the issue drilling permits. Disaster-affected communities, see the processes that are not transparent in the drilling project conducted by corporations (PT LBI). At first, PT LBI conveys the public that the purchase of land residents by PT LBI were going to be used for the location of the chicken farm, not for the drilling location (exploration) of oil and gas.

At the time of sale and purchase transactions, most people were not aware that their land were purchased by the PT LBI, since the process of buying and selling was represented by chief of village Renokenongo. The land owners did not know exactly who the buyer of their land. Residents believe to the information of Renokenongo village chief that land of residents who were purchased land were going to be used for  the location of the chicken farm. After buying and selling land occured, the location was then covered with zinc, so residents did not know what was done in the zinc fence. Residents realized that the location  was used for oil and gas drilling by PT LBI after the blast of the mudflow occured.

Second; Injustice (controversy) associated with inconsistency of the implementation of spatial policy. In accordance with Regulation of the Sidoarjo Regency No. 16 of 2003, that the Sub-District Porong, Jabon Tanggulangin was prioritized for residential areas, agriculture and industry, not for the area of oil and gas exploitation (or mining). Then the regulation No. 16 of 2003  were updated with the Regulation No. 6 of 2009 , which stated that the main function of Sub-District of Porong, Jabon, Tanggulangin,  and Krembung  as a residential area, geological conservation, industry, agriculture, and trade of regional scale. In line with the Regional Regulation of Sidoarjo Regency No. 16 of 2003, the East Java Provincial Government issued a Regulation  East Java Province No. 2 of 2006, which also states among other things that the Sidoarjo region, especially Porong area and surrounding areas earmarked for residential, agricultural, and industries.

Thus, the reproduction of injustice in the context of Lapindo mudflow disaster, forms violation to the rule of exploration activities  (drilling)  oil and gas who conducted in the middle of residential areas.

Third, the form of injustice (controversy) relates to the cause of the mudflow disaster. Society states that the cause of the mudflow disaster in Porong and surrounding areas is human error. While, the government and the corporations (PT LBI) stated that the factor causing the mud volcano is natural factors.

Lapindo mudflow disaster is a disaster that is very complex viewed from the genealogy of the disaster. Theoretical debates involving experts from all over the world. Generally, expert opinion was split into two camps. People argued that this disaster was caused by drilling activity in gas exploration wells Banjar Panji-1 (BJP-1) belongs to PT LBI and the rest argued that the mudflow disaster was caused by the  Yogyakarta earthquake on May 27, 2006, two days before the Lapindo mudflow disaster occurred. But in the " AAPG 2008 International Conference & Exhibition " , the view of the world geologists about the cause of the mudflow was divided into four groups. First, three experts from Indonesia  assumed that the earthquake of Yogyakarta was the cause; Second , 42 world experts expressed that drilling activity process by PT LBI was the cause; Third , as many as 13 experts who expressed that the combination of seismic and activity of  drilling was the source of the cause , and Fourth , 16 experts could not determine their opinion. While the report Audit Agency (BPK), dated May 29, 2007 found that there were technical errors in the drilling process by PT LBI .

Thus, in the context of disaster of Lapindo Mudflow, the reproduction of injustices is determined by the factors caused by mudflow in Porong and surrounding areas as natural factors, so called natural disasters. It is deniable that human error factor (human error) was the cause of it. Determination of the mudflow as natural disasters resulted in the reduction of the corporate responsibility (PT LBI) in handling disasters, particularly the impact of health, economic, social, and so on.

Fourth; forms of injustice (controversy) was felt by the victims of the Lapindo mud associated with the mention of the term, ie society gave term as "Lumpur Lapindo" (Lula) mean as Lapindo Mudflow, while the government and corporations (PT LBI)  named it "Lumpur Sidoarjo" (Lusi) which meant Sidoarjo Mudflow. Peoples who weremaffected by mudflow disaster give term Lapindo Mudflow because they assumed that the source of the mudflow disaster was caused by the conduct of exploration of oil and gas by the PT LBI. The term Sidoarjo Mudflow indicated the impression that the PT LBI did not feel guilty to the mudflow disaster causing misery for residents who lived there.

There are two reasons why the corporation (PT LBI) should be responsible. First, technological failures results disruption to lives and livelihoods in the form of loss of property, psychological impact, and even human casualties, which ends up in loss of livelihoods, shelter, life, and so on. It would be considered as a violation of rights guaranteed by law; Secondly, it is the duty of every corporation to act for precautionary, so that his actions does not lead to disaster. Moreover, in developing and producing oil and gas field, the contractor shall perform in accordance with the conservation and implement the rules of good engineering, and equipment comply with the required standards.

Fifth; forms of injustice (controversy) perceived by victims, is related to the division of responsibility for the payment of compensation. As stipulated in Presidential Decree No. 14 of 2007,  that the victim of disaster of mudflow victims were divided into two categories: inside  area or "the Map of Affected Impact Area" (Peta Area Terdampak), and outside     are or "the Map of Affected Impact Area" (Peta Area Terdampak). The compensation settlement process for inside area is the responsibility of the corporation (PT LBI ), while the outside area compensation settlement process is the responsibility of government through state funds. In subsequent journey, compensation payment process within "the Map of Affected Impact Area"  was not running smoothly. Until the year of 2012, PT LBI had not completed the redress process. For the victims who are in the outside area, the implementation of compensation payments relatively run smoothly . This condition is considered by the victims who entered "the Map of Affected Impact Area" as a form of discrimination and injustice from the government.

Sixth; forms of injustice (controversy) wa sfelt by the victims of the Lapindo mud associated with the treatment of their status as victims of natural disasters. As victims of natural disasters, residents were forced to leave their homes to move to another place. They received living allowance for three months,  housing stipend, and  contract money for two years, while the payment of compensation for land and buildings  were paid in installments process. However, other rights as citizens did not get bailed.

National Committee on Human Rights of Indonesia (Komnas HAM), noted that the disaster of Lapindo mudflow had created conditions which led to unprotected victims and did not fulfill of human rights acts.

Seventh; forms of injustice (controversy) felt by the victims of the Lapindo mud related to the role of government more pro-capitalist (pro-business) rather than pro-people (pro-victims). The government's attitude was considered "soft" against the corporation (PT LBI). It showed that government did not dare to dismantle Lapindo mudflow activities. Government was powerless to press PT LBI to be responsible for the mudflow. Government was considered fail playing its role. The Government also considered not having serious deal with victims who were vulnerable to sexual harassment and criminalization, the incident of Lapindo mudflow had added to burden women's lives.

Eighth; forms of injustice (controversy) that felt by the victims of Lapindo mud related to the response of the PT LBI (Bakrie) in mudflow solving problem. Bakrie pleaded not feeling guilty on the Lapindo mudflow in Sidoarjo. Even so, he still bought the land and responsible citizens in the process of payment of compensation as the "orders of mother". According to Bakrie, PT LBI  was found not guilty by the Supreme Court, and the decision is final and binding. However, because of "the mother", Bakrie ordered to buy land and buildings belonging to the victim, so he complied. Bakrie described land and buildings owned by PT LBI it is not compensation but the compensation gained.

Residents argued that  PT. LBI should be responsible for the mudflow disaster that caused by technical errors during drilling. For the citizens, the cause was because of human error in Lapindo mud drilling. Thus, the PT LBI was obliged and must be responsible in resolving the issues regarding the impact of the mudflow.

2. The Process of NGO's Advocation

Advocacy efforts by  NGOs for victims of Sidoarjo mud conducted through the litigation process, includes:

First; action lawsuit was against the law and violations of Human Rights (Ham) in the case of Sidoarjo  mudflow  on initiative of the Foundation of Indonesia Legal Aid (YLBHI).In December of 2006, approximately eight months after the Lapindo mudflow occurs, Lapindo mudflow victims  did  claims on the suffered loss and violations of Human right. Action of social movements the Lapindo mudflow victims was in order to ask for the accountability of government and PT LBI on violations of Human Rights. This action was supported and represented by a team, called "the Advocate Team of Humanitarian  Sidoarjo Mud Victims". It consisted of 59 public advocates and assistant of public advocate from the Foundation of Indonesian  Legal Aid (YLBHI). The Humanitarian Advocacy team of  Sidoarjo mudflow victims, did lawsuit action. Letter of claim was submitted to the Chairman of the District Court Central Jakarta, on December 8, 2006, in the case No.. 384/Pdt.G/2006/PN.JKT.PST[24].

The Advocate Team of Humanitarian on behalf of the victims of the Lapindo mudflow disaster, sued the defendant. They were the President of the Republic of Indonesia (the first defendant), the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources (the second defendant),  Minister of Environment (as the defendant III),  Executive Agency of Oil and Gas (as the defendant IV), the Governor of East Java (named as defendants V), Regent of Sidoarjo (named as defendants VI), and the PT. Lapindo Brantas Incorporated (as the co-defendant). According to the plaintiffs, the defendants had committed a category of acts against the law in the case of Sidoarjo mud. According to the plaintiffs, they took into account that the disaster would cause adverse impact on the environment and humanity, but the defendants did not take the necessary measures to anticipate the impact of the mudflow in the early days of the mudflow. This shows that the defendants, as state officials had not acted in accordance with its legal obligations.

According to the Foundation of Indonesia Legal Aid  (YLBHI), that the loss caused by the mudflow included the following: (1) the right to life in the form of loss of life due to its gas pipeline explosion on November 22, 2006, (2) The right for forming of viable life caused of declining quality of life of peoples who suffer as the impact of hot mudflow,  both direct and indirect victims from the hot mudflow, (3) the right to freedom from fear experienced by victims  and society in Sidoarjo and surrounding areas including fishermen in the Madura strait, (4) the right of  housing of victims who have lost their homes due to  mudflow, (5) the right to work because  loss of livelihood and employment due to  mudflow, (6) the right to education in the form of loss of educational opportunities due to undergo  mudflow, (7) children's rights in the form of dispossession of the rights of children to acquire good care of his parents, to play and be creative, and take part in education, due to  mudflow, (8) women's rights, namely a loss of protection to women due to  mudflow, and (9) in the form of loss of proprietary property belonging to victims of the  mudflow.

The Indonesia National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) concluded several human rights violations caused by the Lapindo mudflow in Porong-Sidoarjo, East Java. Some showed the violations of human rights such as the rights to life. Based on the findings of the national Commission on Human Rights, the government failed to meet the standards and the right to a decent environment. Another breach was in terms of the right to information. The government also did not make the early warning system which coupled with the emergence of gas bubbles that could potentially cause a fire. The disaster of Lapindo mudflow in Sidoarjo, also eliminated the right of self-development, the right of housing, right of having food, right of being health, right of getting work, as well as the right of having education. Because of the disaster, about 2,288 people stopped working due to the factories where they worked was not operating. There were 33 schools were damaged which made 1,774 students from elementary, junior high, high school, and a boarding school lost a place to learn since their school building were inundated by mud[25].

The Indonesia National Commission on Human Rights, also noted that due to the mudflow disaster, the victims  lost welfare rights (property rights) since their assets has been drowned by the mud. It implicated to the loss of a family and the right to continue the descent. National Commission on Human Rights of Indonesia also mentioned that in the context mudflow disaster, in Porong, Sidoarjo, the government or the responsible party had also violated the rights for vulnerable groups such as the disability, the elderly, children, and women. Proven in the field, there were no special treatment for pregnant women and no guarantee of security against girls from violence or sexual abuse since there were no specific separation between men and women. With the violation of the rights of the victims of the mud, it implied that their right to social security did not meet at all.

Plaintiff appealed to the District Court Judge  the Central of Jakarta for doing a hear and determined the followings: (1) Received entirely in favor of PLAINTIFF, (2) stated that the Defendant and Co-defendant had done tort, (3) Punish  DEFENDANT for issued a policy that ordered to restore the rights of the victims of the mudflow in Sidoarjo, with the provision that the affected communities can regain their rights with equal or better value as the original as before the mudflow occured, (4) defendant was Ordered for issuing a policy in order  to stop the mudflow by mobilizing all available resources and considered the Peoples rights, including the right to a healthy environment;(5) ordered the parties Defendant issuing a policy that can legally guarantee the entire costs that had been incurred related to the reduction of mudflow and the restoration of the rights of victims, (6) Defendants were ordered to instruct all the ranks of law enforcement agencies for explicitly take legal action expressly, law enforcement and prosecution of all those responsible, including responsible business leaders whose activities had triggered the mud; and (7) ordered the Defendants to make written apologize to the victims and announced it through 5 (five) national television station, 5 (five) radio stations and 10 (ten) national print media for three consecutive days.

Panel of Judges of the District Court Central Jakarta rejected claims the Foundation of Indonesian Legal Aid (YLBHI) against the government and PT Lapindo Brantas Incorporated (Inc) about the handling of the mudflow. The decision of District Court central Jakarta dated 27 November 2007 and rejected the lawsuit the Foundation of  Indonesia Legal Aid. It stated that the government  and PT. Lapindo Brantas Inc., did not take an unlawful act.  On  the reading of the verdict in the Central Jakarta District Court who was chaired Moefri just considered that PT Lapindo had spent a lot of money to cope with the mud flow. It did not show that that the government and Lapindo did not guilt[26].

Assembly rejected claims to defendant as a whole. Assembly considered that the government has issued a policy that needs to handle the mudflow that occurred on May 2006, by forming an integrated team for management of mud. Meanwhile, PT Lapindo Brantas Inc.,  judged to have spent a lot of money,  more less 1, 6 triliunt rupiah  to pay the cost of living allowance for the refugees, and to handle the mudflow. "Since the mudflow occurred at a drilling location on May 29, 2006, refugees have been evacuated to Porong Market with transportation provided by Lapindo. Lapindo also have to pay the contract fee and the cost of the displaced school children of the victims, "said Martini Mardja.

The Foundation of Indonesian Legal Aid (YLBHI) formally appealed the decision of the Central Jakarta District Court, and refused the lawsuit of the Foundation of Indonesia Legal Aid related to the case. Appeal was done because the decision of the judges was weak. A ground of appeal was taken by the Foundation of Indonesia Legal Aid, because the decision of the judges had a substantial number of weaknesses. One of them was that the judges did not consider any violation of rights to fulfillment of economic, social, and cultural victims, such as the loss of homes, jobs, land, and so on. However, High Court in Jakarta on June 13, 2008 upheld the verdict the District Court in Central Jakarta on November 27, 2007 which stateed that the incident of mudflow in Sidoarjo  caused by the nature is more dominant, rather than by human error.

Furthermore, the Foundation of Indonesia Legal Aid (YLBHI) filed an appeal to the Supreme Court. The decision of the Supreme Court on 3 April 2009 rejected the appeal the Foundation of Indonesia Legal Aid, and stated that of the mudflow was a natural phenomenon and there were no the fault of the industry, and this decision had permanent legal force (inkracht)[27].

Second; Action Lawsuit was done by Indonesian Forum for the Environment (Walhi). Along with the lawsuit in the District Court of Central Jakarta by the Foundation of  Indonesia Legal Aid, the Indonesian Forum for Environment (Walhi) did lawsuit in the South Jakarta District Court.

Indonesian Forum for the Environment (Walhi) filed a lawsuit against PT Lapindo Brantas and the government because they believed these two parties should be responsible for the environmental damage caused by the mudflow in Sidoarjo. Civil suit was filed to the South Jakarta District Court. The lawsuit against the government was taken, because the government deemed not doing action for controlling. Walhi sued 12 parties, namely: PT Lapindo, PT Energi Mega Persada, Kalila Energy Limited, Pan Asia Enterprise, PT Medco Energy, Santos Australia Limited. From the government official department, it sued the President, the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, the Executive Agency for Upstream Oil and Gas, Ministry of Environment, the Governor of East Java and Sidoarjo Regent[28].

Walhi lawsuit against PT. Lapindo Brantas Inc., and the government was apparently rejected by the South Jakarta District Court, in Jakarta. South Jakarta District Court, on the 27th of December 2007.

In the verdict of the judges, all defendants won, including PT Lapindo Brantas Inc., and the government. Judge considered mudflow at the Banjar Panji-1, Sidoarjo, East Java, as a common natural phenomenon. This decision was considered by Walhi as environmental injustice. The reason the panel of judges in a ruling that was read out, because the defendant that is PT Lapindo Brantas Inc., acquitted of committing a mistake in the mudflow case that resulted in damage to the environment as being sued by Walhi. Although rejecting Walhi lawsuit, the judge insisted that the defendants retains responsibility for designing the process to stopping the mudflow.

Furthermore, Walhi appeal in the level of High Court of Jakarta. But the ruling of High Court of Jakarta on October 27, 2008 strengthened the verdict of the South Jakarta District Court on the date of   December 27, 2007 which stated that the mudflow in Sidoarjo was caused by natural phenomena. The Clerk Court of South Jakarta District stated that  the decision of  High Court of  Jakarta on October 27, 2008 already legal and binding (inkracht).

Advocacy efforts were undertaken by the NGO namely Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) and Indonesian Environmental Forum (WALHI) in defending the interests of victims of the Lapindo mudflow disaster through litigation turned out a failure.

3. Government Intervention:

Government intervention in the rehabilitation process of social manifested in three forms of facilitation, they are: policy, institutional, and allocation of budget funds.

First; Facilitation of Policy. The government policy on the handling of the impact of the Sidoarjo mudflow since the events occurs of 2006 to 2013, stated in Presidential Decree, as follows:

(1)     dated on 8 September 2006, published Presidential Decree (Presidential) No. 13 of 2006 on the National Team of Sidoarjo Mudflow Mitigation (PSLs national team). This team has a duty to take operational steps in an integrated manner in order to control the mudflow in Sidoarjo which include: closure of the mud flow, handling mudflow and sludge problems. Establishment of National Team in Sidoarjo Mudflow Mitigation does not reduce the responsibility of PT Lapindo Brantas to perform mitigation and restoration of environmental damage and social problems it causes. Costs required for the implementation of the National Team duties charged to the budget of PT. Lapindo Brantas.

(2)     dated 8 April 2007, was issued Presidential Decree (Decree) Nomo 14 of 2007 on the Sidoarjo Mud Mitigation Agency. Presidential Regulation No. 14 of 2007 replaces the Presidential Decree No. 13 of 2006, thus the existence of the National Response Team Mudflow in Sidoarjo (PSLS) has ended and their duties were taken over by the Sidoarjo Mudflow Mitigation Agency (BPLS). BPLS task is dealing with the mudflow mitigation efforts, handles mudflow, addressing social issues and infrastructure that caused mudflow in Sidoarjo, with attention to the smallest environmental risks.

In appendix Presidential Decree Number 14 of 2007, be included the area that goes into the Affected Area Map, which is the area submerged in mud, as the proposed by national team of PSLs. The area which entrance in to the  "Map of Affected Area" includes four villages namely: Siring Village, Village Jatirejo, Kedung Bendo, and Renokenongo village, and then the area of  "the Map of Affected Area" region plus six villages, namely: the village of Ketapang, Kalitengah Village, Village Glagah Arum, Gempolsari Village, Pejarakan, Mindi village, and the village Keboguyang. The  area which  include into "the Map of Affected Area", ie the area which  drowning by mud,  covering more less 613.4 Ha. Under article 15, Presidential Decree No. 14 of 2007, PT Lapindo Brantas Inc., was required to buy the land and buildings owned by citizens who are in "the Map of Affected Area"  region through buying scheme with phased payments, ie 20% prepaid and the rest was paid no later than one month before the contract period of 2 (two) years finished.

But until now the process of buying and selling land and building assets by PT Lapindo Brantas Inc., could not be solved completely. Based on the result of an agreement between the victims and  PT Lapindo Brantas Inc.,  it was agreed the value of the sale, namely: for building of Rp 1.5 million per square meter, for land for Rp 1 million per square meter, and for the land of rice fields Rp 150 thousand per square meter.

(3)  dated on July 17, 2008, be issued Presidential Decree No. 48 Year 2008 on Amendment of Presidential Regulation No. 14 Year 2007 on the Sidoarjo Mud Mitigation Agency. One consideration of the issuance of Presidential Decree No. 48 of 2008 is that the mudflow in Sidoarjo had social impact for the community in outside "the Map of Affected Area"  dated March 22, 2007 (Attachment Presidential Decree No. 14 of 2007). Furthermore, the process of buying and selling of land and buildings owned by citizens who include in the area outside "the Map of Affected Area"  was performed by the Sidoarjo Mudflow Mitigation Agency (BPLS) with reference to the amount of the buying price paid by PT Lapindo Brantas Inc., as same as with the one inside  "the Map of  Affected Area". Costs of buying and selling outside the PAT refer to the Presidential Decree No. 48 of 2008 were charged to state funds. Being issued in Presidential Decree No.  48/2007, the areas affected by the Lapindo mudflow were grouped into two categories, namely:  the region inside   "the Map of Affected Area" and the region outside of  "the Map of  Affected Area".

(4) Further, dated on 23 September 2009 published Presidential Decree Number 40 Year 2009; later dated 27 September 2011 published Presidential Decree Number 68 Year 2011; dated 5 April 2012 published Presidential Decree No. 37 of 2012, and last on May 8, 2013 published Presidential Decree Number 33 of. The core of this regulation is the addition of an area outside "the Map of Affected Area". Specialized in Perpes No. 33 of 2013 has started to set about the mechanism of reimbursing citizens’ land.

Second, Forming Institutional. In particular, to address various issues related to the Sidoarjo mudflow disaster, the government set up an agency, called "the Mitigation Agency of Sidoarjo Mudflow"  which is regulated by Decree of the President of the Republic of Indonesia Number 14 Year 2007. Based on this regulation, the Mitigation Agency of Sidoarjo Mudflow  have responsibility   to mudflow handling, dealing with social issues and infrastructure caused by the mudflow in Sidoarjo, with attention to the smallest environmental risks. Furthermore the Mitigation Agency of Sidoarjo Mudflow must report its performance of duties to the President.

The Agency of Migitation  Sidoarjo Mudflow (BPLS) consists of the Governing Board and the Executive Board. The Steering Committee is responsible for providing direction, guidance and supervision of the implementation of the mudflow prevention efforts, mudflow handling, handling social issues and infrastructure caused by the mudflow in Sidoarjo, which implemented Executive Agency. The Steering Committee consists of: Chairman  Minister of Public Works, ; Vice Chairman: Minister of Social Affairs; concurrent Member; Members: Minister of Finance, Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, Ministry of Home Affairs, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, Minister of Transportation, Minister of State for Planning National Development Planning / Head of National Development Planning Agency, Ministry of Environment, the National Land Agency, the Governor of East Java, the regional military commander V / Brawijaya, the East Java Regional Police Chief, and Regent of Sidoarjo. The organizational structure of the Executive Board consists of: Head of the Executing Agency, Deputy Head of the Executing Agency, the Secretary of the Executive Board, Deputy for Operations, Deputy Social Affairs, and Deputy of Infrastructure.

Efforts made by the Agency of Mitigation  Sidoarjo Mud  include handling the Lapindo mudflow and handling the problems solving of socio-civic  as the impact of the Lapindo mudflow. In efforts to address problem solving social, the programs of the Agency of Mitigation Sidoarjo Mud include: social assistance, social protection, and social recovery. Social assistance was given in the form of: medical aid and clean water, aid money for contracts, evacuation cost and life assurance money.

Social protection was given in the form of the process of buying and selling land and buildings owned by the victims of Lapindo mudflow disaster both by PT MLJ or by the Agency of Mitigation  Sidoarjo Mud. The process of social recovery was given in the form of: training activities (sewing shoes, ribbon embroidery, gold carpentry, automotive, modes, processed food, sewing machine technician, entrepreneurship, disaster response, and poultry), and extension activities and dissemination of information.

Third, Budget Allocation. Determination of Sidoarjo mudflow affected areas were divided into two categories. They were, first, areas that belong to "the Map of Affected Area", and second, outside the regions including "the Map of Affected Area". Funds for handling the impact of the mudflow in "the Map of Affected Area" region is the responsibility of PT Lapindo Brantas Inc. While the mudflow handling funds that are outside   "the Map of Affected Area" is the responsibility of the government through the budget of state.

The total government budget who absorb state budget funds to control the Lapindo mudflow as much as 6.2 trillion rupiah. Budget was calculated from the year of 2008 until 2013, while budget allocations in 2007 amounted to 505 billion rupiah taken from the emergency budget item. The details are as follows: budget of 2008 as much as 1.1 trillion rupiah, 2009 amounted to 1,147 trillion rupiah, 2010 amounted to 1.2  trillion rupiah, 2011 amounted to 1.2 trillion rupiah, 2012 amounted to 1.5 trillion Rupiah and budget of  2013 amounted to 2,2 trillion rupiah[29].

In accordance with the mandate of the law of the Republic of Indonesia  No.. 24 Year 2007 on Disaster Management, the Indonesia Central Government had responsibility in the process of implementation of disaster management, both in the event of natural disasters, non-natural disasters, and social disaster. Responsibility of the Indonesia Central Government in Disaster Management include: (1) integration of disaster risk reduction  into development programs, (2) Protection of the public from the effects of disasters, (3) Guarantee the fulfillment of rights and refugee communities affected fairly and in accordance with the minimum service standards,(4) recovery from disaster conditions, (5) Allocation of budget disaster management in the state budget revenues and expenditures are adequate;(6) Allocation of budget disaster management in the form of ready-made funds (funds that backed the government is ready to use funds in case of a disaster), and (7) Maintenance of records / documents authentic and credible than the threat and impact of disasters.

While the authority of the Indonesia Central Government in Disaster Management include: (1) Establishment of disaster management policy in line with national development policies, (2) Preparation of development plans that incorporate elements of disaster management policies, (3) Determination of the status of disaster, national and regional levels; (4) Determination of policy cooperation in disaster management with other countries, agencies, or other international parties, (5) Formulation of policies on the use of technology as a potential source of threat or hazard; (6) Formulation of policies to prevent and control depletion natural resources exceeds the natural ability to do the recovery, and (7) Control for collecting money or goods that is national (including the  licensing for collecting money or goods that are under the authority of the national Minister of Social Affairs).

From the above explanation, the government intervention in handling Sidoarjo mudflow disaster problems can be summarized as follows:

Table:
GovernmentIntervervensi Descripiton
InSidoarjoMudflow Disaster

No.	Intervention	Specification	Evaluation Form
1.	Facilitation of Policy.	Government issuedPresidential DecreeNo.. 13/2006. ThenPresidential Decree No.. 14/2007, Presidential Decree No.. 48/2008, Presidential Decree No.. 40/2009, Presidential Decree No.. 37/2012, andPresidential DecreeNo.33/2013.	In principle, government policy regulates matters relating to: the division of the territory inside and outside of " the Map of Affected Area", payment mechanisms of buying of land and building assets owned the victims,  basic for BPLS forming, and guarantee for the allocation of the state budget. Notes: (1) This policy suggests that residents as the seller is not as a victim, and (2) None of the government would recover social-ecological life which was damaged by Lapindo mudflow disaster.
2.	Institutional formation.	Forming of PSLs National Teams then replaced with BPLS.	Task: dealing with the mud flow mitigation efforts, handles mudflow, dealing with social issues and infrastructure. Note: Focus BPLS in tackling socio-civic issues is still absent.
3.	Facilitation of Fund/Budget Allocation.	Government to allocate funds through the State Budget: 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011&2013.	Until 2013 the total budget allocation of Rp6.2trillion. These funds are mostly used for: payment of the sale of land and buildings owned by the victim's out PAT, closing burst and jetting mud, and handling social issues. Note: Portions of the budget for social-community problem-handling is still relatively small.

Conclusions and Suggestions

From the description of the results of the study as described above, it can be concluded as follows:

Social advocacy to victims of the Lapindo mudflow disaster was performed by NGOs in the form of litigation and advocacy. Active NGOs in social advocacy to victims of the disaster of  Lapindo mudflow   were the Indonesia Forum for Environmental (Walhi) East Java, and the Foundation of Indonesian Legal Aid (YLBHI).

On the other side, government intervered in the form of making policy, institutional formation, and allocation of funds. Government policies in an effort to overcome the problems Lapindo mudflow disaster was stated in the form of Presidential Decree, namely: (1) of Presidential Decree No.13/2006, (2) Presidential Decree No.. 14/2007, (3) Presidential Decree No. 48 of 2008, (4) Presidential Decree No. 40 of 2009, (5) Presidential Decree Number 68 Year 2011; (6) Presidential Decree No. 37 of 2012, and (7) Preidential Decree No. 33 of 2013. From the institutional aspect, the form of government intervention manifested by the team formation the Agency of Sidoarjo Mudflow Management (PSLs), which is then replaced with the Agency of Sidoarjo Mud Mitigation (BPLS). In terms of budget, the government intervention was realized in the form of Budget allocation policies in the state budget that has already absorbed about 6.2 trillion rupiah in 2013.

The next research would be highly recommended to observe and  study further all to the implementation of disaster management in the context of the handling the Lapindo mud disaster issues, which include: migitasi phase, emergency response, and recovery phases.

***

Acknowledgements
This research wasfundedby:
Directorate of Researchand Community Services,
DirectorateGeneral ofHigher Education
Ministryof EducationandCultureof the Republic ofIndonesia

via:
DecentralizationResearchProgram
Directorate of Researchand Community Services,
MuhammadiyahUniversity ofMalang
in 2013

***

---

[1]Batubara, Bosman & Utomo, Paring Waluyo.2012. Kronik Lumpur Lapindo: Skandal Bencana Industri Pengeboran Migas di Sidoarjo. Yogyakarta: INSITPress. P.3.

[2]Prasetia, Heru; & Batubara, Bosman (eds.). 2010. Bencana Industri: Relasi Negara, Perusahaan, dan Masyarakat Sipil. Depok: DESANTARA.

[3]http://www.pesa.com.au/publications/pesa_news/dec_jan_0809/pesanews_9722.html.

[4]Richard Davies, dkk., ahli geologi dari Universitas Durham, Inggris, menulis dalam Journal of the Geological Society.

[5]Tempo Interaktif. Edisi Jumat, 25 Pebruari 2011.

[6]Direktorat Bantuan Sosial Korban Bencana Sosial, Dirjen Bantuan dan Jaminan Sosial, Depsos RI. 2004. Pola Penanganan Korban Bencana Sosial di Indonesia.

[7]Peraturan Kepala Badan Nasional  Penanggulangan Bencana Nomor 11 Tahun 2008 Tentang Pedoman Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Pasca Bencana.

[8]Miller, Valerie, & Covey, Jane. 2005. Pedoman Advokasi: Perencanaan, Tindakan, dan Refleksi. Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia.

[9]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advocacy

[10]Samuel, John. 2007. Public Advocacy and People-Centred Advocacy: Mobilising for Social Change. Development in Practice, Vol.17, No. 4/5 (Aug., 2007), pp. 615-621.

[11]ibid.

[12]Miller, Valerie, & Covey, Jane. 2005. Pedoman Advokasi: Perencanaan, Tindakan, dan Refleksi. Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia.

[13]Bennet, Edwars M. (ed.). 1987. Social Intervention: Theory and Practice. Lewiston & Queenston: The Edwin Mellen Press.

[14] ibid

[15]Loewenberg, FM. 1977. Fundamentals of Social Intervention: Core Concepts and Skills for Social Work Practice. New York: Columbia University Press.

[16] Ibid.

[17]Direktorat Bantuan Sosial Korban Bencana Sosial, Dirjen Bantuan dan Jaminan Sosial, Depsos RI. 2004. Pola Penanganan Korban Bencana Sosial di Indonesia.

[18]Denzin, Norman K.; & Lincoln, Yvonna S. 2009. Handbook of Qualitative Research (terj.). Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar.

[19]Salim, Agus (peny.). 2001. Teori dan Paradigma Penelitan Sosial: Pemikiran Norman K. Denzin & Egon Guba, dan penerapannya. Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana.

[20]Marvasti, Amir B. 2004. Qualitative Research in Sociology: An Introduction. London: SAGE Publications.

[21] Op.cit.

[22] Op.cit.

[23]Creswell, John W. 2007. Quantitative Inquiri & Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches. London: SAGE Publications.

[24]ttp://id.wikisource.org/wiki/Surat_Gugatan_Perbuatan_Melawan_Hukum_Kasus_Lumpur_Panas_Sidoarjo.

[25]http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2012/08/14/063423492/Komnas-HAM-Kasus-Lapindo-Adalah-Kejahatan

[26]http://gebraklapindo.wordpress.com/2007/11/28/majelis-hakim-tolak-gugatan-ylbhi-soal-lumpur-lapindo/

[27]http://kabarinews.com/jakarta-mahkamah-agung-tolak-kasasi-ylbhi-atas-kasus-lapindo/33148.

[28]http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2007/02/12/05693046/Walhi-Gugat-Lapindo-dan-Pemerintah (Diakses tgl 23 Pebrauari 2013)

[29]Source: http://www.bpls.go.id.

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